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Analysis on Boolean function in a restricted
(biased) domain
Subhamoy Maitra, Bimal Mandal, Thor Martinsen, Dibyendu Roy and Pantelimon Stănică
Abstract—Boolean functions are usually studied under the
assumption that each input bit is considered independent and
identically distributed. However, in the case of some stream
ciphers, a keystream bit is generated by using a nonlinear
Boolean function with inputs from a restricted domain. At Eu-
rocrypt 2016, one such stream cipher (FLIP) has been proposed,
where a Boolean function on n variables was exploited with
inputs of weight n
2
only. Recently, Carlet et al. studied several
properties of such functions and obtained certain bounds on
linear approximations of direct sum in the restricted domain.
In this paper, we observe that for a direct sum like f = f1 + f2,
the inputs to each sub-function f1, f2 do not follow a uniform
distribution in the restricted domain. In this regard, we study
the properties of Boolean functions by considering a general
probability distribution on the inputs. We further obtain several
bounds related to the biases of direct sums. Finally, we obtain
a lower bound on the bias of the nonlinear filter function of
FLIP. Our results provide a general framework to study security
parameters of ciphers over restricted domain.
Index Terms—Bias, Boolean Function, FLIP, Pseudo-
Randomness, Restricted Domain, Sequences, Stream Cipher,
I. INTRODUCTION
F INDING an efficient homomorphic encryption schemeusing symmetric key cryptography is a current trend
of research. In this direction, recent study shows that an
efficient stream cipher can provide significant efficiency in
homomorphic encryption. One important work that came in
this direction is [1]. In 2017, Méaux [5] first presented the
design specification of one stream cipher, which supports ho-
momorphic encryption. The cipher, which is named FLIP, was
cryptanalyzed by Duval et al. in Crypto 2016 [3]. Later, the
modified design of FLIP (which resists the attack introduced
at Crypto 2016) was proposed at Eurocrypt 2016 [6]. The
keystream bit of the FLIP stream cipher is computed by using
a nonlinear filter function defined over a restricted domain. A
detailed study on Boolean functions over a restricted domain
is done by Carlet et al. [2] and Mesnager et al. [8].
In this paper we observe that a different technique needs
to be followed to study the Boolean function defined over
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restricted (or biased i.e., not uniform) domain. We first note
that the design specification of a stream cipher, which supports
homomorphic encryption, must be very simple to maintain er-
ror growth of the underlined homomorphic encryption scheme.
To maintain the error growth the nonlinear filter function used
in this kind of stream cipher has very simple Algebraic Normal
Form (ANF). In fact the nonlinear filter function must have
many linear terms and the degree of the function has to be
quite low. From the design specification of the FLIP stream
cipher it can be noticed that the intersection of variables’ sets
involved in any two monomials of the function is empty. With
this kind of restrictions, this function does not carry good
cryptographic properties. Hence, the cipher requires a large
number of variables to provide a desirable security. Due to
this, the state size of FLIP is very large and the nonlinear
filter function has very simple ANF. Several properties of this
kind of function can be easily checked if we assume that
the inputs of the function follow a uniform distribution and
they are mutually independent. However, in the case of the
FLIP stream cipher this does not happen as the domain of the
nonlinear filter function is restricted to a sub-domain. More
specifically, each input point has a constant weight. Carlet et
al. [2] and Mesnager et al. [8] have done mathematical analysis
on this kind of function. Several theoretical bounds have been
found in [2], [8]. Although specific numerical comparison is
not available, in this paper, we try to fill this gap.
The design of a stream cipher is motivated towards gener-
ating pseudo-random (binary) sequence given a small initial
seed. The general trend is to consider several linear or nonlin-
ear feedback shift registers and to combine the outputs with
certain nonlinear Boolean functions. The quality of the design
is judged by how well a sequence close to uniform and true
random stream can be simulated. While this field is already
developed quite a bit, the present constraints arising out of
homomorphic encryption opened up a new direction. The basic
design ideas for such stream ciphers have been modified as we
will explain in Section I-B. Based on that we need to study
several components of the new design and analyse the quality
of the sequence generated out of the evolution of such circuit.
Our prime motivation here is to study the Boolean functions
under a restricted scenario and the possibility of biases (this
is related to non-randomness) in the output sequence due to
that.
Now we would like to explain the problem in more technical
point of view. The notations which are used for explanation
are described in the Subsection I-A. In 2017, Carlet et al. [2]
first observed that different cryptographic properties of a
Boolean function change significantly when the domain of
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the function changes from Fn2 to a restricted subset E ⊂ Fn2 .
From the design specification of the FLIP stream cipher, it
can be observed that the weight of the register (i.e., state)
in each round remains fixed, due to the different state update
function. Hence, the weight of the inputs of the nonlinear filter
function remains constant. More specifically, if the size of the
register (i.e., state) is n, then the weight of the inputs of the
nonlinear filter function remains at n2 for all rounds. Hence the
nonlinear filter function always takes input from a restricted
subset En,n2 ⊂ F
n
2 . From this observation, Carlet et al. [2]
studied several cryptographic properties of Boolean functions
on the restricted domain to provide the security parameters
for FLIP. In 2018, Mesnager et al. [8] also investigated
several properties of Boolean functions on restricted domain,
although, the results proposed by Mesnager et al. [8] do not
relate to the direct sum of Boolean functions. There is no
numerical data related to the theoretical results available in
the existing works [2], [8], and further, we would also like to
mention that the results of [2], [8] are obtained by considering
the complete function in the restricted domain.
In this paper, we look into the problem from a different
direction. We first observe that if x ∈ En,k (see Section I-A
for the definition) and x = x1||x2|| . . . ||xn (|| denotes the
concatenation) then x1, x2, . . ., xn does not follow a uniform
distribution. This motivates us to study the Walsh–Hadamard
transform from a different perspective. We consider the exact
probability distribution of each x1, x2, . . ., xn to study the
Walsh–Hadamard transform of each sub-function fi, where
f(x) = f1(x1) + . . . + fn(xn). One may note that if the
input xi of fi does not follow a uniform distribution, then the
cryptographic properties of fi differ significantly from the case
when xi follows uniform distribution. From this observation
(considering the exact probability distribution), we expect to
obtain tighter bound of the original bias of a Boolean function
over a restricted domain as well as a tighter bound of the
bias of nonlinear filter function of the FLIP stream cipher. A
tighter bound definitely provide a better idea about the security
parameters of the FLIP stream cipher.
Contribution and Organization. In our approach we consider
the exact probability distributions of inputs of each sub-
functions (fi) of f =
∑
i fi. With this consideration, we intro-
duce our tools to analyse the properties of Boolean functions
in Section II. In Section III we describe our prime motiva-
tion to obtain linear approximations of n-variable nonlinear
Boolean functions whose domain is restricted to E ⊂ Fn2 . The
mathematical expressions we obtain in this direction are quite
complicated to compare to the results obtain in [2], [8]. Note
that the results obtain in [8] are not related to the direct sum
of functions. We provide a clear numerical evidence for better
understanding of our results in Section IV. The nonlinear
filter function of FLIP530(42, 128, 360) is also considered to
compare to the results of [2]. One can easily calculate that the
maximum absolute Walsh–Hadamard transform value lies in
the interval [2−79, 2−78], when we assume that the inputs of
the function follow a uniform distribution (i.e., the probability
of each input is 12530 ). Hence, the original bias of the function
in the uniform domain is quite low. However, our results
show that when the inputs of the nonlinear filter function of
FLIP530(42, 128, 360) is restricted to a subset E530,265 (i.e., all
points are of weight 265) then the restricted Walsh–Hadamard
transform value is much higher. In fact, the maximum absolute
value lies in [2−18.49, 2−13.59]. We obtain the upper bound of
the bias (i.e., 2−13.59) by considering the theoretical results
of [2] and the lower bound (i.e., 2−18.49) is obtained by using
our tools. Our results fill the gap of the results obtained in [2]
by calculating a lower bound of the bias of the function of the
FLIP stream cipher on a large number of variables.
We first describe some background material, which are
required for our work in the next section.
A. Boolean functions
Let F2 be the two-element {0, 1} field and Fn2 be the
extension field over F2 of degree n. Let Fn2 = {x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) : xi ∈ F2, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n} be the vector
space over F2 of dimension n. Let x = x′||x′′ ∈ Fn2 denotes
the concatenation of x′ and x′′. The total number of elements
belonging to a set S is known as the cardinality of the set and
it is denoted by |S|. A Boolean function f in n variables is a
mapping from Fn2 to F2 (i.e., f : Fn2 −→ F2). The set of all
Boolean functions in n numbers of variables is denoted by Bn.
Any n-variable Boolean function f has a unique polynomial
representation, known as the Algebraic Normal Form (ANF)










, for all x ∈ Fn2 , where µa ∈ F2.
For any x ∈ Fn2 , the Hamming weight of x is denoted by
wt(x) =
∑n
i=1 xi, where this sum is taken over the ring
of integers. The algebraic degree of an n-variable Boolean
function is defined as deg(f) = maxa∈Fn2 {wt(a) : µa 6= 0}.
The set of all elements x ∈ Fn2 of weight i is denoted
by En,i, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n. The support of f ∈ Bn
denoted by supp(f) contains the set of all x ∈ Fn2 such
that f(x) = 1. For an n-variable balanced Boolean function
|supp(f)| = 2n−1. A Boolean function f ∈ Bn is an
affine function if the deg(f) is at most 1. The set of all
affine functions involving n variables is denoted by An i.e.,
An = {la,ε : a ∈ Fn2 , ε ∈ F2}, where la,ε(x) = a · x + ε, for
all x ∈ Fn2 . An affine function is linear if ε = 0. The Hamming
distance between any f, g ∈ Bn is denoted by dH(f, g) and
defined as dH(f, g) = |{x ∈ Fn2 : f(x) 6= g(x)}|. The
correlation between two n-variable Boolean functions f , g
is defined by
corr(f, g) =
∣∣∣∣ |{x : f(x) = g(x)}| − |{x : f(x) 6= g(x)}|2n
∣∣∣∣ .
The correlation between an n-variable Boolean function f and
a linear function la,0 can be measured by Walsh–Hadamard







The correlation between the Boolean function f and the linear
function la,0 is the absolute value of the Walsh–Hadamard
transform of f ∈ Bn at the point a ∈ Fn2 , i.e., corr(f, la,0) =
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|Wf (a)|, for all a ∈ Fn2 . The set {|Wf (a)| : a ∈ Fn2} provides
the correlation between the Boolean function f and the set




Wf (a)2 = 1, which is known as Parseval’s




Boolean function f ∈ Bn (n even) is said to be bent if and
only if the correlation between f and {la,0|a ∈ Fn2} is 12n/2 ,
i.e., corr(f, la,0) = |Wf (a)| = 2−
n
2 , for all a ∈ Fn2 . Now
to calculate the correlation between an n-variable Boolean
function f and an n-variable linear function la,0 over a
restricted set E ⊂ Fn2 , one needs to consider the inputs from
the restricted set E. To define this notion over the restricted
domain En,k, we consider a Boolean function f ∈ Bn, which
takes input from En,k. With this in mind, the (restricted
domain) correlation between the Boolean function f and a
linear function la,0 is,
corr(k)(f, la,0) =








. To calculate the above mentioned
correlation, we define the Walsh–Hadamard transform of an
n-variable Boolean function in the restricted domain En,k,







If E is a subspace in Fn2 , b ∈ Fn2 , then E′ = b+E is a flat
in Fn2 . Also, E⊥ = {x ∈ Fn2 : a · x = 0, for all x ∈ E} is
the orthogonal complement of E. Further, we recall that for




2dimE(−1)a·b, if a ∈ E⊥;
0, otherwise. (1)
Two more notations are defined here, which are used through-
out the article.
Definition 1. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ En,k and n =
n1 + n2, and x′ = (x1, . . . , xn1), x
′′ = (xn1+1, . . . , xn).
Then En=n1+n2,kn1,i = {x
′ ∈ Fn12 | x ∈ En,k, n = n1 +
n2 and wt(x′) = i} and En=n1+n2,kn2,j = {x
′′ ∈ Fn22 | x ∈
En,k, n = n1 + n2 and wt(x′′) = j}.
Certainly, the above splitting process can be done for n =
n1+n2+n3, or, more generally, for n = n1+n2+· · ·+nq , and




etc., can be inferred from Definition 1.
B. Design specification of the FLIP stream cipher
In this section we describe a brief design specification of the
FLIP stream cipher. More detailed design specification can be
found in [6]. The FLIP cipher is based on three components:
one register of length n, one pseudorandom number generator
(PRNG), one nonlinear filter function F involving n-variables.
The register of the cipher is initialized by an n-bit secret
key K and a PRNG is initialized by an initialization vector
IV . In each clock the PRNG generates a number which
corresponds to a permutation. This permutation permutes the
state bits of the register. Finally, the nonlinear filter function
computes the keystream bit by taking the current state as input.
The nonlinear filter function F = f1 + f2 + f3 has three
sub-functions f1, f2 and f3, where f1 is a linear function,
f2 is a quadratic bent function and f3 is a special type
of triangular function. The ANFs of f1, f2 are as follows:
f1(x0, x1, . . . , xn−1) =
∑n−1
i=0 xi, f2(x0, x1, . . . , x2n−1) =∑n−1
i=0 x2ix2i+1. The last function f3 is the direct sum of
r many triangular function Tk, where each Tk involves in-
dependent variables. The ANF of each triangular function










final algebraic normal form of the nonlinear filter function F
is F = f1 + f2 +
∑r
i=1 Tk.
For our numerical analysis, we concentrate on the nonlinear
filter function of FLIP(42, 128, 8∆9) [6]. Here, n = 530 =
n1 +n2 +n3, n1 = 42, n2 = 2× 64 = 128 and n3 = 8 · (1 +
2+ · · ·+9) = 360. The first sub-function f1 contains 42 linear
terms, the second sub-function f2 contains 64 monomials of
degree 2 and the last function f3 is a direct sum of 8 triangular
functions. Each triangular function has exactly one monomial
of degree 1 to 9, i.e., each triangular function involves 45
variables.
The initial state of register of FLIP only takes an n-
bit string of weight n2 . After that, in each round, the one
permutation is generated by using a pseudorandom generator.
This permutation permutes the index of state bits to update
the state of the register. Then, the nonlinear filter function F
takes the updated state as input and generates keystream bit.
Due to the update procedure of FLIP, the weight of the state
of the register of FLIP remains fixed (i.e., n2 ) in each round.
So, every time, the keystream bit is computed by applying
the nonlinear filter function F on a state of weight n2 , i.e.,
F (Stn) = zt, where S
t




An older version of FLIP [5] was cryptanalyzed by Duval
et al. [3] at Crypto 2016. In that paper, two instances of FLIP
stream cipher, namely, n = 192 (n1 = 47, n2 = 40, n3 = 105)
and n = 400 (n1 = 87, n2 = 82, n3 = 231) were cryptan-
alyzed with the complexities 254, 268 respectively. Later in
Eurocrypt 2016, Méaux et al. [6] proposed a modified design
of FLIP, which prevents the attack proposed at Crypto 2016.
Our work is based on the cipher proposed at Eurocrypt 2016.
II. TOOLS FOR OUR ANALYSIS
Before describing our technical results, we first provide a
brief overview on the existing results. The algebraic normal
form of the nonlinear filter function (F ) of FLIP is very
simple. Due to this simplicity, the nonlinearity of the function
F can be easily calculated by using standard Walsh–Hadamard
transform. It can be observed that in the uniform domain
2−79 < maxa∈F5302 |WF (a)| < 2
−78. This is explained in the
following section.
A. Walsh–Hadamard transform of the Boolean function in an
instance of FLIP
We compute the maximum value of the Walsh–Hadamard
transform of the filter function in 530 variables, which is
mentioned in [2, Table 1].
Lemma 1. Let f ∈ Bn be defined by f(x) = x1x2 · · ·xn, for
all x ∈ Fn2 . Then Wf (a) = δ0(a)−
(−1)wt(a)
2n−1 , for all a ∈ F
n
2 .
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and the lemma is shown.
Using Lemma 1 and the Walsh–Hadamard spectrum of a
bent function we get the next result.
Theorem 1. Let f ∈ F5302 be the direct sum f(x) = f1(x′) +
f2(x
′′) + f3(x
′′′) of three functions f1 ∈ B42, f2 ∈ B128, f3 ∈
B360, where x = x′||x′′||x′′′, x′ ∈ F422 ,x′′ ∈ F1282 and x′′′ ∈
F3602 , and fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, are defined as in the FLIP cipher.


































where a = a′||a′′||a′′′, a′ ∈ F422 , a′′ ∈ F1282 and a′′′ ∈ F3602 ,
and f̃2 is the dual of f2. Here, a′′′ = a′′′1 || . . . ||a′′′8 ; a′′′i ∈
F452 , 1 ≤ i ≤ 8, a′′′i = a′′′i1|| . . . ||a′′′i9; a′′′ij ∈ F
j
2, 1 ≤ j ≤ 9,
and a′′′i2 = a
′′′
i21||a′′′i22.
Proof. The first sub-function f1 of the nonlinear filter function
of the FLIP stream cipher is the linear function f1(x′) =∑42
i=1 xi, for all x
′ ∈ F422 . The Walsh–Hadamard transform







where δ1(a′) is the Dirac function which is 1, if a′ = 1
and 0, otherwise. The second sub-function f2 of the nonlinear
filter function of the FLIP stream cipher is a bent function
involving 128 variables (which can be found in Section I-B).
The Walsh–Hadamard transform f2 at the point a′′ ∈ F1282 is,
Wf2(a′′) = 2−64(−1)f̃(a
′′), where f̃ is the dual of f and a′′ ∈
F1282 . The last function is a direct sum of 8 small triangular
functions as in Section I-B. From Lemma 1 we get the Walsh–
Hadamard transform values of all monomials of each of the
triangular functions. Since, if f(x,y) = f1(x)+f2(y), for all
x ∈ Fn12 and y ∈ F
n2
2 , then Wf (a,b) = Wf1(a)Wf2(b), for
all a ∈ Fn12 and b ∈ F
n2
2 , the claim follows.
From Theorem 1, we obtain the following consequence.
Corollary 1. Let x ∈ F5302 and f ∈ B530 as in Theorem 1.
Then:
(i) the maximum absolute value ofWf (a) for some a ∈ F5302




(ii) the maximum value is achieved at a = 1||a′′||a′′′, 1 ∈
F422 , a′′ ∈ F1282 , and a′′′ ∈ F3602 , such that a′′′i1 = 1 ∈
F2, a′′′i2 ∈ F22, 1 ≤ i ≤ 8, and a′′′ij = 0 ∈ F
j
2, 1 ≤ i ≤
8, 3 ≤ j ≤ 9.
(iii) the maximum bias of the function f from la,0 = a · x,
where a ∈ F5302 is 2−79 < maxa∈F5302 |Wf (a)| < 2
−78.
However, when we consider the same function in a restricted
domain, then the scenario changes significantly. At the end of
the paper, we will see that the maximum absolute restricted
Walsh–Hadamard spectrum is indeed much higher in the
restricted domain E530,265, lying in [ 1218.49 ,
1
213.59 ]. The lower
bound is obtained by using our results, and the upper bound is
obtained by implementing the result of Carlet et al. [2]. Thus,
the simple Walsh–Hadamard transform does not provide the
correct value and it is much higher when the inputs are from
a restricted domain E530,265.
B. Our idea: Frequency distribution of concatenated sub-
strings of a fixed weight bit string
We first consider an n bit string x with wt(x) = k, i.e., x ∈
En,k. In this n-bit string x, if we consider the first n1 bits, say
x′, then the weight distribution of x′ may not be uniform. If the
distribution of x′ is different, then the cryptographic properties
of the function defined over x′ will be affected. In IACR ToSC,
Carlet et al. [2] studied several cryptographic properties of the
complete function f = f1 + f2 + f3 (the direct sum of three
functions f1, f2, f3) without considering the exact probability
distributions of the inputs of each sub-functions, f1, f2, f3.
To get the correct picture about the complete function f , one
needs to study each function fi (i = 1, 2, 3) by considering
the exact probability distribution of inputs of each of the fi’s.
For the simplicity of our discussion, we first consider
n = n1 + n2 and x ∈ Fn2 , which is the concatenation of
x′,x′′ (i.e., x = x′||x′′), where x′ ∈ Fn12 and x′′ ∈ F
n2
2 . Let
Pr(x) = 12n denote the probability of picking x ∈ F
n
2 . We
recall that En,k denotes the set of all n-bit strings of weight k.





, 0 ≤ k ≤ n. So,
Pr[x], when x ∈ En,k is equal to 1(nk)
. Now if we consider
x′ ∈ En=n1+n2,kn1,i , 0 ≤ i ≤ n1 then Pr[x





consider the following example to explain it more clearly.
Consider the set E4,2 (i.e., |E4,2| = 6). Now, if we
consider the first two bits of x ∈ E4,2 then |E4=2+2,22,0 | =
1, |E4=2+2,22,1 | = 4 and |E
4=2+2,2
2,2 | = 1. So, Pr(x′ = 00) =
1
6 = Pr(x
′ = 11), P r(x′ = 01) = 13 = Pr(x
′ = 10). The
Figure 1 represents the probability distribution of points in
the uniform case with n = 4, in the uniform case with n = 4,
k = 2 and in restricted case with n = 10, k = 5 and n1 = 4.
Let π be any permutation on the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Then (xπ(1), xπ(2), . . . , xπ(n)) ∈ En,k for all x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ En,k. We consider x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈
En,n2 and x
′ = (y1, y2, . . . , yn1) ∈ F
n1
2 where yi = xi,
1 ≤ i ≤ n1. We are now interested to calculate the frequency
distributions of x′.
Case 1: Consider the case when n1 = n2 . It can be observed










many elements of x′ with wt(x′) = i, 0 ≤
i ≤ n2 exist and each bit pattern of the same weight occurs an
equal number of times.











































































(c) For restricted case n = 10, k =
5, n1 = 4
Fig. 1: Probability distributions
Case 2: Consider the case when n1 < n2 . Also, here, all










elements x′ ∈ Fn12 with wt(x′) = i are present, where
0 ≤ i ≤ n1.
Case 3: Consider the case when n1 > n2 . Now we find the




∣∣{x′ ∈ Fn12 | wt(x′) = n2 }∣∣ = (n1n2 ), where
every such element occurs exactly once. In general, for each









times (0 ≤ i ≤ n− n1).
In the rest of the paper, we consider ni < n, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2,
and x ∈ En,n2 .
III. BIASED WALSH–HADAMARD TRANSFORM
In this section, we define the Walsh–Hadamard transform
of a Boolean function by considering the general probability
distribution (not necessarily uniform) of input elements. For
our convention, we shall name this as biased Walsh–Hadamard
transform of a Boolean function (another definition can be
found in [4]). Biased Walsh–Hadamard transform of a function
at a point a is basically the bias between a Boolean function
and a linear function la,0 over a non-uniform domain.
Let p(a) be the probability of an input element a ∈ Fn2
in f ∈ Bn. Recall that 0 ≤ p(a) ≤ 1, for all a ∈ Fn2 , and∑
a∈Fn2
p(a) = 1. For any f, g ∈ Bn, we let S(f, g) = {x ∈
Fn2 : f(x) 6= g(x)} and S̄(f, g) = Fn2 \ S(f, g) = {x ∈
Fn2 : f(x) = g(x)}.
Now we define the concept of Hamming distance between
two functions in a non-uniform domain. We call this the biased
Hamming distance between two functions f , g and denote it















































where WBf (a) =
∑
x∈Fn2
p(x)(−1)f(x)+a·x is the biased Walsh–
Hadamard transform of f ∈ Bn at a ∈ Fn2 . The bi-
ased Walsh–Hadamard spectrum of f ∈ Bn is the multiset[
WBf (a) : a ∈ Fn2
]
. It can be observed thatWBla,0(a) = 1 and
WBla,0(b) may or may not be zero for a 6= b, which differs
from the uniform domain case.
Further, we define the correlation between two functions
f, g ∈ Bn in a non-uniform domain, denoted by corrB(f, g),










It can be observed that corrB(f, la,0) =
∣∣WBf (a)∣∣ .
A. Theoretical estimates of biases in non-uniform domain
Theorem 2 (Biased Parseval’s Identity). Let f ∈ Bn, and p(x)
be the probability of x ∈ Fn2 . Then∑
a∈Fn2









































and the result is shown.
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Theorem 3. Let p :=
√∑
x∈Fn2
p(x)2 and a := min
x∈Fn2
p(x) (we











, where the lower bound
becomes equality if and only if for all x, p(x) = 2−n (uniform
domain) and the upper bound is an equality if and only if
there exists 2n−1 ≤ α ∈ Z such that exactly α of the p(x) are
equal to a = 12α , and exactly 2
n−α of the p(x) are equal to
A = 12(2n−α) .
Proof. From Theorem 2, we get max
a∈Fn2
|WBf (a)| ≥ p, other-
wise, if max
a∈Fn2









which is a contradiction. So, we must have max
a∈Fn2
|WBf (a)| ≥ p.
















with equality if and only if xi, yi are proportional; as well as


















0 < a ≤ xi ≤ A, 0 < b ≤ yi ≤ B,















∈ Z and α of the numbers x1, . . . , xN
are equal to a and β of these numbers are equal to A, and if the
corresponding numbers yi are equal to B and b, respectively.
To get the lower bound in the second claim, we apply
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality with N := 2n, xi := p(i), yi := 1,
where i is the n-bit vector obtained from the binary expansion
of i, and observe that
∑N
i=1 xiyi = 1. The equality will happen
if xi/yi is constant, and since
∑
x∈Fn2
p(x) = 1, we get that
p(x) = 2−n for all x ∈ Fn2 (uniform domain).
To get the upper bound in the second claim, we apply Pólya-
Szegö inequality with N := 2n, xi := p(i), yi := 1, b = B :=






∈ Z and exactly α of the p(x) are equal to a, and
exactly β of the p(x) are equal to A. Observe that aα = Aβ,
β = 2n − α, and since
∑
x∈Fn2
p(x) = 1, then aα + Aβ = 1,
which renders aα = Aβ = 12 , so a =
1
2α , A =
1
2(2n−α) ,
α ≥ 2n−1. The theorem is shown.
Based on this result, we may require to redefine several
existing characteristics of a Boolean function, for example
balancedness or bentness in restricted domain. Certain results
in this direction are presented in the subsection III-B.
B. Properties of Boolean functions in biased domain
A Boolean function f ∈ Bn is said to be (biased) bent in the
non-uniform domain if the absolute value of the biased Walsh–




Next, we say that a function f ∈ Bn is (biased) balanced











Remark 1. Let p(x) be the probability of x ∈ Fn2 . Since for

















Example 1. Let f, g ∈ B4 be two Boolean functions as in
Table I. In the uniform domain, f is balanced but g is not
balanced, however, both f and g are balanced in the biased


























































TABLE I: Biased balanced Boolean functions
We now calculate the number of maximum possible distinct
values of the biased Walsh–Hadamard transform of a symmet-
ric Boolean function.












Krawtchouk polynomial of degree i. Let f ∈ Bn be a
symmetric Boolean function and f(x) = εi ∈ F2 if wt(x) =
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i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n. The Walsh–Hadamard transform of f at a ∈ Fn2


























Theorem 4. Let x ∈ Fn2 with probability p(x). We assume
that if wt(x) = wt(y), then p(x) = p(y), x,y ∈ Fn2 . Then
there exist at most n+ 1 distinct values of the biased Walsh–
Hadamard transform of a symmetric function f ∈ Bn.
Proof. We have p(x) = p(y) when wt(x) = wt(y), x,y ∈
Fn2 . Let pn,i = p(x) and f(x) = εi ∈ F2, for all x ∈ Fn2 with






















where Ki(wt(a), n) is the Krawtchouk polynomial of degree
i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, computed at wt(a). Since for all a,b ∈ Fn2 with
wt(a) = wt(b), Ki(wt(a), n) = Ki(wt(b), n), 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
the result is shown.
The first sub-function of the nonlinear filter function of
the FLIP stream cipher is a symmetric function involving 42
variables in the uniform domain, so it will have at most 43
distinct biased Walsh–Hadamard coefficients. The next section
describes the nature of the biased Walsh–Hadamard transform
of a linear function.
C. Biased Walsh–Hadamard transform of an affine function
Let n = n1 + n2 and x = x′||x′′ ∈ Fn2 such that x′ ∈ F
n1
2
with probability p(x′). Assume that if wt(x′) = wt(y′), then
p(x′) = p(y′), x′,y′ ∈ Fn12 .
Proposition 1. Let n = n1+n2, n1 < n2 and x = x
′||x′′ ∈ Fn2
such that x′ ∈ Fn12 with probability p(x′). Let u′ ∈ F
n1
2 , ε ∈
F2, and f(x′) = u′ · x′ + ε, for all x′ ∈ Fn12 . Then
WBf (a′) =





′ + u′), n1), otherwise,
where qn1,i = p(x
′) if wt(x′) = i and Ki(wt(a′ + u′), n1)
is the Krawtchouk polynomial of degree i, where 0 ≤ i ≤
n1, computed at wt(a′ + u′), i.e., Ki(wt(a′ + u′), n1) =∑
x′∈En1,i
(−1)(a′+u′)·x′ .



















and the proposition follows.
From Proposition 1 we get the biased Walsh–Hadamard
transform of the linear function f1 ∈ Bn1 , f1(x) =∑n1
j=1 xj = 1 · x, which is used in the FLIP cipher.
Corollary 2. Let n = n1 +n2 +n3 and f1(x) =
∑n1
j=1 xj =
1 ·x, for all x ∈ Fn12 , which is used in the FLIP cipher. Then








where ā = a+ 1, the complement of a, and Ki(wt(ā), n1) is
the Krawtchouk polynomial of degree i, computed at ā.
It can be observed that the properties of a linear function
change significantly in a biased domain.
Example 2. Let n = 10 and n1 = 4. The total number of bit






f(x) = 1 ·x, for all x ∈ F42, which is the parity of the weight
of x. The probability of a bit pattern x′ ∈ F42 having weight i
and the biased Walsh–Hadamard transform of f are given in


























Thus, the sum of the squares of the biased Walsh–Hadamard
coefficients is equal to 1.076, and so there is a bias with
respect to the other linear functions (we could infer the sum
of the squares of the biased Walsh–Hadamard coefficients > 1
from Theorem 3, which also gives the upper bound of the sum








= 98 = 1.125).
D. Biased Walsh–Hadamard transforms of some Boolean
functions
In this section we study the biased Walsh–Hadamard trans-
forms of some particular functions. We first observe that, it is
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TABLE II: Biased Walsh–Hadamard spectrum of linear
Boolean function
difficult to calculate the biased Walsh–Hadamard transform of
a bent or triangular function, in arbitrary number of variables,
directly. To tackle this, we first compute the biased Walsh–
Hadamard transform values of monomials Boolean functions,
and then, we derive an iterative formula to calculate the biased
Walsh–Hadamard spectrum.
Theorem 5. Let f ∈ Bn. The following are true:
(i) Let En,k be the set of vectors of weight k in Fn2 . The
(unnormalized) restricted nonlinearity of f at c ∈ Fn2
can be computed by∑
x∈En,k




(ii) If f(x) = x1x2 · · ·xn and x ∈ Fn2 with probability
p(x), then the biased Walsh–Hadamard transform of f
at a ∈ Fn2 is equal to


































We now prove the second claim. Observe that (−1)ε =
1 − 2ε, ε ∈ F2. Also, it is clear that f(x) = 1 only when






















where supp(la,0) is defined as in Section I-A, and our theorem
is shown.
From Theorem 5, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Let x ∈ Fn2 with probability p(x) as defined
above, and let f ∈ Bn be defined by f(x) = x1x2 · · ·xn, for
all x ∈ Fn2 . Then:
(i) WBf (0, 0, . . . , 0) = 1− 2p(1).
(ii) If a 6= 0,1 and la,0 is a biased balanced linear function,
then WBf (a) = −2p(1)(−1)wt(a).
Proof. The first claim follows directly from Theorem 5 when







, the second claim follows.
In Section III-C, we saw that the behavior of a linear
function in the biased domain is different than its behavior
in the uniform domain. This is also true for bent functions, so
in the biased domain, a bent function may not remain bent.
For example, let n = 10 and f ∈ B4 be the bent function
f(x) = x1x2 + x3x4. The biased Walsh–Hadamard transform
of f is given in Table III. Also, the sum of the squares of the
biased Walsh–Hadamard coefficients of f is 1.0763.



































































































TABLE III: Biased Walsh–Hadamard spectrum of a bent
function
E. The biased Walsh–Hadamard transform of a direct sum of
Boolean functions
In this section, we consider the direct sum of two Boolean
functions f1 and f2 (i.e., f = f1 + f2) in a biased domain.
Firstly, we prove the convolution theorem in the biased do-
main. Further, we present several results related to bound on
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bias of direct sum of Boolean functions. Let n = n1 +n2, and
x = x′||x′′ ∈ Fn2 , where x′ ∈ F
n1
2 and x
′′ ∈ Fn22 . Then, it can
be observed that Pr[x] = Pr[x′,x′′] = Pr[x′/x′′]Pr[x′′] =
Pr[x′′/x′]Pr[x′], for any x ∈ Fn2 . The biased Walsh–
Hadamard transform of f(x) = f1(x′)+f2(x′′) at a = a′||a′′















where p(x′/x′′) = Pr[x′/x′′]. From Equation (2), it can
be observed that it is difficult to calculate biased Walsh–
Hadamard transform of f = f1 + f2, even though we have
the biased Walsh–Hadamard transform of two sub-functions
f1, f2, due to the fact in general Pr[x′/x′′] 6= Pr[x′].
Let us consider n = n1+n2 and f(x) = f1(x′)+f2(x′′) on
Fn2 , where f1(x′) depends on the first n1 number of variables
of x and f2(x′′) depends on last n2 number of variables. Here
x = x′||x′′. If the domain of f is the uniform domain, then
one can calculate the Walsh–Hadamard transform of f at the
point a by calculating the Walsh–Hadamard transform of f1
and f2 at the points a′ and a′′, respectively, where a = a′||a′′.
Thus, only two independent tables of size 1×2n1 and 1×2n2
are required to calculate the Walsh–Hadamard spectrum of
f . However, this is not the scenario for the biased Walsh–
Hadamard transform. From Theorem 6 and Corollary 4 it can
be observed that we need more information to calculate the
biased Walsh–Hadamard transform of f at a point a. In fact
we need three probability tables P1, P2 and P3 of sizes 1 ×
(n + 1), 1 × (n1 + 1) and 1 × (n2 + 1) corresponding to
x ∈ Fn2 , x′ ∈ F
n1
2 and x
′′ ∈ Fn22 , respectively, and we also
need two more tables Tf1 and Tf2 of sizes 2
n1 × (n1 + 1) and
2n2 × (n2 + 1) (in the worst case) corresponding to the biased
Walsh–Hadamard transform values of f1 and f2, respectively.
Certainly, the computation complexity will increase when the
there are many terms in the direct sum.
Next, we present a convolution theorem over the inputs of
fixed weight. We are interested to compute WB(k)f (as defined
in Equation (2), but here the sum is over x ∈ En,k) for f =
f1 + f2, where 0 ≤ k ≤ n. One may note that if x,y ∈ Fm2
and wt(x) = wt(y), then Pr[x] = Pr[y]. We use the notation
pm,i to denote Pr[x], for all x ∈ Em,i, where 0 ≤ i ≤
m. In Equation (3), we show a relation between the Walsh–
Hadamard transform of a Boolean function in the uniform and
non-uniform domain:





W(k)f (a), ∀a ∈ F
n
2 , (3)
where 0 ≤ k ≤ n and p = Pr[x : wt(x) = k].
Theorem 6 (Restricted Domain Convolution). Let n = n1+n2
and f = f1 + f2, where fi ∈ Bni , i ∈ {1, 2}. Then, for any
a = a′||a′′ ∈ Fn2 and 0 ≤ k ≤ n,









































































The above relation can also be rewritten in terms of the biased









Hence, we obtain both the relations in terms of the Walsh–
Hadamard transform in the uniform and non-uniform domains.
The following corollary follows from Theorem 6.
Corollary 4. Let n = n1 + n2 and f = f1 + f2, where































We have already observed that it is indeed difficult to
compute the biased Walsh–Hadamard transform of f = f1+f2
over a biased domain with a large number of variables. So
we continue computing an appropriate bound for the biased
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Walsh–Hadamard transform of f ∈ Bn, where f = f1 + f2 ∈
Bn, with fi ∈ Bni , i = 1, 2.
In 2017, Carlet et al. [2] proved the following lemma.
Lemma 2 ([2]). If n = n1 + n2 and f = f1 + f2, fi ∈ Bni ,
i ∈ {1, 2}, then
max
a




















The following theorem shows that using biased Walsh–
Hadamard transform we may get an improved bound.


































From the Theorem 7 it can be observed that the upper bound














One may think that G can be smaller than
maxa∈Fn2 |W
(k)
f (a)|. In fact, we have observed that in
some cases G ≤ maxa∈Fn2 |W
(k)
f (a)| but under some specific
conditions G ≥ maxa∈Fn2 |W
(k)
f (a)|. To prove both the
inequalities we start with the following lemma.
Lemma 3 ([7]). Let ai be positive numbers and bi be
any integer numbers (positive or negative), where i =
























aibj have opposite signs, then∣∣∣∑ki=0 aibi∣∣∣ ≥ (∑ki=0 ai) ∣∣∣∑kj=0 bj∣∣∣ .
We use the result of Lemma 3 to prove G ≥ max
a∈Fn2
|W(k)f (a)|.
The proof of the the Theorem 8 can be found in [7].
Theorem 8 ([7]). Let f = f1 + f2 ∈ Bn, fi ∈ Bni , i = 1, 2,



















































where pn,k = 1(nk)










AiBi have opposite signs.
Our next result shows that, under some specific conditions
the lower bound of max
a∈Fn2
|W(k)f (a)| can be achieved in terms
of the biased Walsh–Hadamard transform.
Theorem 9. Let 0 ≤ i ≤ k, ci ∈ Fn12 , di ∈ F
n2


































































































































and the theorem is shown.
IV. MORE ACCURATE CALCULATIONS OF BIASES BY OUR
TECHNIQUE AND COMPARISONS WITH PREVIOUS WORK
This section presents a numerical comparison between our
bound and the bound proposed by Carlet et al. [2] (see
Lemma 2). We first consider a 12-variable FLIP type function
to provide a comparison, then we proceed further to compare
the same for the nonlinear function of FLIP.
A. Comparison for a small Boolean function
We consider a small Boolean function f on 12 variables
(FLIP type). The function f is a direct sum of three functions
f1, f2, f3 (i.e., f = f1 + f2 + f3), where f1(x0, x1) =
x0 +x1, f2(x0, . . . , x3) = x0x1 +x2x3 and f3(x0, . . . , x5) =
x0 + x1x2 + x3x4x5. So, f(x0, . . . , x11) = f1(x0, x1) +
f2(x2, . . . , x5)+f3(x6, . . . , x11). We assume that the function
f takes inputs from a restricted set E12,6. We consider two
types of Walsh–Hadamard transforms to compute bounds
for bias of f . We first consider classical Walsh–Hadamard
transform Wf (same as Carlet et al. [2]), and secondly, we
consider our defined biased Walsh–Hadamard transform WBf .
We first compute both types of Walsh–Hadamard transform
values (classical and biased) of f1, f2, f3 for all possible
weights of the inputs of each function. Let x = x1||x2||x3
and f(x) = f1(x1) + f2(x2) + f3(x3). We compute the
maximum absolute Walsh–Hadamard transform values of f1,
f2, f3 corresponding to each weight of x1, x2 and x3. From
these maximum absolute Walsh–Hadamard transform values
we compute the maximum absolute value of Walsh–Hadamard
transform of f(x) = f1(x1) + f2(x2) + f3(x3), when x ∈
E12,6. We multiply those maximum absolute Walsh–Hadamard
transform values for which wt(x1) + wt(x2) + wt(x3) = 6.
We further add these multiplied values. To compute the bias







Here the domain of the function f is E12,6. We have
observed that, the actual bias of the function f in E12,6 is
≈ 0.264069. One may note that in uniform domain (i.e., F122 )
l1 = la1,0 = x0 +x1 +x6 is the closest linear function to f as
the monomials of the form xixj or xixjxk are always 0 unless
all variables involved in the monomials are 1. It has been ob-
served that, the biases between f and l1 in the domains F122 and
E12,6 are |Wf (a1)| = 0.09375 and |W(6)f (a1)| = 0.099567,
respectively. If we restrict the domain of the function f to
E12,6, then the bias between f and a linear function is highest
for l2 = la2,0 = x0 + x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6
instead of l1 = x0 + x1 + x6. The bias between f and l2
in restricted domain E12,6 is |W(6)f (a2)| = 0.264069, but
the bias between f and l1 in the restricted domain E12,6 is
|W(6)F (a1)| = 0.099567. The linear functions which are closest
to f in E12,6 are provided below:
1) la2,0 = l2 = x0 + x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6:
|W(6)f (a2)| = 0.264069, |Wf (a2)| = 0.09375.
2) la3,0 = l3 = x0 + x1 + x2 + x3 + x6 + x7 + x8:
|W(6)f (a3)| = 0.264069, |Wf (a3)| = 0.09375.
3) la4,0 = l4 = x0 + x1 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x8:
|W(6)f (a4)| = 0.264069, |Wf (a4)| = 0.09375.
4) la5,0 = l5 = x2 + x3 + x9 + x10 + x11: |W
(6)
f (a5)| =
0.264069, |Wf (a5)| = 0.
5) la6,0 = l6 = x4 + x5 + x9 + x10 + x11: |W
(6)
f (a6)| =
0.264069, |Wf (a6)| = 0.
6) la7,0 = l7 = x7 + x8 + x9 + x10 + x11: |W
(6)
f (a7)| =
0.264069, |Wf (a7)| = 0.
Table IV provides a comparison between the original bias
and the bounds obtained by using classical and biased Walsh–
Hadamard transforms. From the Table IV it can be observed
Original bias ≈ 0.264069
Carlet et al. [2] ≤ 0.772727
This paper ≥ 0.20857
TABLE IV: Correlation bound comparison
that our bound is much tighter than the bound proposed by
Carlet et al. [2].
B. Comparison for the actual nonlinear filter function of FLIP
In this section, we provide a comparison of the bounds
for the bias of the nonlinear filter function of the FLIP
stream cipher. To compute the bounds we extend the ideas of
Section IV-A. We consider the nonlinear filter function F of
FLIP530(42, 128, 360). This function is a direct sum of three
Boolean functions f1, f2 and f3 (i.e., F = f1 + f2 + f3),
where f1 is a linear function involving 42 variables, f2 is
a quadratic bent function involving 128 variables and f3 is
a direct sum of 8 triangular functions. Here, each triangular
function is of degree 9 and involving 45 variables. As each
triangular function has one degree one term, so the final linear
function of F will involve 50 variables. Also each, triangular
function has exactly one term of degree two. Hence F will
have 72 terms of degree 2, involving 144 variables.
We follow the same technique as in the toy example. We
compute the bias bound by using classical and our biased
Walsh–Hadamard transform. To compute the bounds, we first
break the complete function f into three parts. In the first part,
we consider 5 linear Boolean functions, each involving 10
variables. The second part is based on 18 quadratic functions,
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each involving 8 variables. The third part is based on eight
degree 3 to degree 9 terms.
We follow a similar technique as in Section IV-A to compute
the bias bound as in Lemma 2 of Carlet et al. [2] and the bound
obtained through our study. The bias bound of Carlet et al.’s
is Gc = 1213.59 . The bias bound obtained using our biased
Walsh–Hadamard transform is Go = 1218.49 . Lemma 2 clearly
shows that Gc will be an upper bound of the original bias (see
Lemma 3 of [2] for more detail).
Our next goal is to show that Go is a lower bound of
the original bias. We use Theorem 9 for this purpose. In the
computation of Go, the product of probabilities (qn1,iqn2,k−i
of Theorem 9) is the product of probabilities corresponding to
the 5 linear functions each involving 10 variables, probabilities
corresponding to 18 functions of degree 2 each involving
8 variables, and the probabilities corresponding to the eight
degree 3, 4, . . . , 9 terms. Experimentally, we observed that the
maximum of this product of probabilities is much smaller
than 1
(530265)
. We replace the product of probabilities by 1
(530265)
to achieve the inequality between Equations (4) and (5) from
the proof of Theorem 9. Further, we observe that all functions,
f1 = x0+x1+x2+x3+x4+x5+x6+x7+x8+x9, f2 = x0x1+
x2x3 + x4x5 + x6x7, f3 = x0x1x2, f4 = x0x1x2x3, f5 =
x0x1x2x3x4, f6 = x0x1x2x3x4x5, f7 = x0x1x2x3x4x5x6,
f8 = x0x1x2x3x4x5x6x7, f9 = x0x1x2x3x4x5x6x7x8
satisfy the condition of Theorem 9. In fact, there ex-




for all weights i.
The existence of a point b corresponding to each weight
starting from weight zero to total weight is given below (points
are provided in integer form)
1) For f1, b: 0, 1023, 0, 1023, 0, 1023, 0, 1023, 0, 1023, 0.
2) For f2, b: 0, 0, 0, 63, 15, 3, 0, 255, 0.
3) For f3, b: 0, 0, 0, 1.
4) For f4, b: 0, 0, 0, 0, 1.
5) For f5, b: 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1.
6) For f6, b: 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1.
7) For f7, b: 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1.
8) For f8, b: 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1.
9) For f9, b: 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1.
Hence, from Theorem 9 we infer that Go = 1218.49 will be a
lower bound of the original bias of the nonlinear filter function
of the FLIP stream cipher. This is summarized in Table V:
Carlet et al. [2] ≤ 1
213.59
This paper ≥ 1
218.49
TABLE V: Correlation comparison
Finally, let us summarize the theoretical results of our
work and compare it to the existing results available in [2],
[8]. Carlet et al. [2] first proved that the lower bound











+ λ (the parameter λ is defined
in [2, Prop. 8, p. 207]). Later, Mesnager et al. [8] provided an
















)γ − λ) (the parameters λ, γ, θ
are defined in [8, Thm. 16]). All these bounds are not related
to the bias of direct sum of functions in restricted domain. In
this paper, we have shown that the original bias of a direct sum
of two functions (i.e., f = f1 + f2) in a restricted domain can
be represented as the biased Walsh–Hadamard transform of f1,
f2. We are able to find a lower bound of the original bias under













∣∣∣WB(k−i)f2 (a2)∣∣∣. Carlet et al. [2]
obtained an upper bound of the original bias of f = f1 + f2
























We note that Mesnager et al. [8] do not provide any result
related to the bias of direct sum of Boolean functions in
a restricted domain. In this paper, we found (under some
conditions) an upper bound of the bias of f1+f2 in a restricted
domain in terms of the biased Walsh–Hadamard transform















In this paper, we have proposed a technique to study the
cryptographic properties of Boolean function, whose inputs do
not follow uniform distribution. In our study, we first define
the notion of correlation between two Boolean functions in a
non-uniform domain. Further, we show a relation between this
correlation and our newly defined biased Walsh–Hadamard
transform. We use the biased Walsh–Hadamard transform to
study several cryptographic properties of a Boolean function,
whose inputs follow a non-uniform distribution. We next show
a convolution theorem for the biased Walsh–Hadamard trans-
form. Due to the computation limitation for the convolution
on a large number of variables, we proved several inequalities
related to the bias of direct sum of functions. Consequently,
we obtained a lower bound for the bias of the nonlinear
filter function of FLIP by using biased Walsh–Hadamard
transform. Further, we provide a comparison with the existing
result. Certainly, our work provides a new direction to study
several properties of Boolean function over a biased domain.
Our results provide more accurate calculation of the biases
of Boolean function over restricted domain, which help to
determine the security parameter of FLIP type ciphers.
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